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ARTICLE
The creative mind: cognition, society and culture
Ib Bondebjerg1
ABSTRACT This article provides an overview of the main tendencies and ideas in the
embodied mind paradigm in the expanding ﬁeld of modern cognitive science. The focus is not
on the biological and neurological aspects of cognitive science, rather the article demon-
strates how basic concepts and theories from cognitive science have inﬂuenced linguistics,
sociology, the understanding of art and creativity, ﬁlm and ﬁlm perception, as well as our
understanding of historical ﬁlm narratives and mediated memories. Although these areas of
humanities and social science may seem unrelated, this article demonstrates how the
embodied mind paradigm has actually forged links between separate scientiﬁc disciplines.
Cognitive science and the embodied mind theory have created a stronger interdisciplinary
connection between cognitive understanding in social science and humanities. Metaphors
and image schema, the way our brain relies on narrative structures, the dynamic ability of the
brain to blend old and new schemas, and the unparalleled creativity of the brain are all part of
the approaches of the cognitive social science and humanities to social interaction, com-
munication and creativity described here. The article also discusses the relationship between
the more universal dimensions of the human mind and the question of cultural and social
variations. The argument here is that a cognitive and more universal theory of human beings
is not the same as determinism. On the contrary, when we understand our universal com-
monalities and the basic functions of our embodied mind we will also be better placed to
understand cultural and social differences and variations.
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Introduction
It ought to be an established fact in all sciences that humanbeings are the result of a long evolutionary development withinteraction between our biology and the social and cultural
conditions under which this evolution has taken place. Yet, in
some sciences to point to biology, genes and the way our brain is
basically constructed as part of an argument of social interaction
or culture and creativity can still raise anger and controversy. The
fact that our mind is embodied, that our language, way of
thinking, our way of interacting with each other, our gender is
ﬁrmly based in our bodies and our brain can still lead to heated
discussions in some branches of academia. Yet, all important
forms of cognitive science have clearly pointed out that it is not a
question of biology and human nature against culture and society.
It is in fact a question of understanding the very complex inter-
action between nature, society and culture—in line with a pretty
long tradition from Darwin onward (see Bondebjerg, 2015).
Mapping the ﬁeld of cognitive science
In one of the early, seminal books on cognitive science, Francisco
J. Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch’s The Embodied
Mind. Cognitive Science and Human Experience (1991) even the
title indicates this. From the ﬁrst sentences of the introduction
they state that their aim is to deﬁne cognitive science as something
that combines an understanding of the lived human experience—
following the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty—with a biological
understanding of the brain. The main point is that we need to:
(..) see our bodies both as physical structures and as lived
experiential structures—in short, as both ‘outer’ and ‘inner’,
biological and phenomenological. The two sides of
embodiment are obviously not opposed. Instead, we
continuously circulate back and forth between them”
(Varela et al., 1991, p 15).
When writing this, the three authors make a statement, which
they at the same time see as criticism of a dominant tendency in
early forms of cognitive science to largely ignore this interaction
between cognition, society and culture. This fundamental inter-
action is however also absent from most forms of human and
social sciences, where a strong tendency towards social con-
structivism has dominated for decades. Taken to a just as fun-
damentalist level as early cognitive science, social constructivism
tend the claim that all social and cultural phenomenon are con-
structions, that in other words cognition and the embodied mind
means very little. What Varela, Thompson and Rosch intend to
do with their book is in their own words not to
(…) build some grand uniﬁed theory (…) our concern is to
open a space of possibilities, in which the circulation
between cognitive science and human experience can be
fully appreciated” (Varela et al., 1991, p 18).
Varela, Thompson and Rosch map the ﬁeld of cognitive science
by pointing to ﬁve main areas (Varela et al., 1991, 7): Neu-
roscience, the central medical science area, Cognitive psychology,
Philosophy and Artiﬁcial intelligence linguistics, and philosophy.
So even at this early stage of mapping a relatively new ﬁeld, we see
the merging of disciplines across natural and medical sciences
and social sciences and humanities. It takes at its starting point
the fundamental structures of our brain and how it works and
combines it with the interaction between brain and body in the
world of human experience, interaction, and communication. So
even though basic neuroscience and artiﬁcial intelligence could
seem to generate the image of cognitive theory and the human
mind as a computer this is quite wrong. As both neuroscientist
themselves and the uses of basic cognitive theory in social
sciences and the humanities demonstrate, our brain and the way
it interacts with culture and society is amazingly creative and
ﬂexible.
Metaphors we think with and live by
Today the ﬁelds of cognitive studies described by Varela et al.
would have to be expanded because communication sciences in a
broad sense, ﬁlm and media studies and studies of art and lit-
erature has now been directly inspired by cognitive psychology
and science. This can partly be explained by the inﬂuence of
Gerorge Lakoff and Mark Johnson beyond linqustics, but also by
cognitive studies of creativity, aesthetic and the arts. Varela et al.’s
book is already quite unusual as a basic introduction to cognitive
science by including phenomenology and aspects of non-western
philosophy, especially the Buddhist notion of mindfulness (Varela
et al., 1991, 23f). Very neurological representations of the brain
and how it works is combined with more experiental dimension
of our mind. But such dimensions also link to Lakoff and John-
son’s seminal founding of a cognitive linguistics in which tradi-
tional understandings of language are replaced by an embodied
theory where language is seen as part of an embodied mind.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnsons book Metaphors we live by
(1980) is a very early and extremely important book, because it
turned linguistics and thus central parts of the humanities com-
pletely upside down. There is a direct link to Varela, Thompson
and Rosch’s basic attempt to move cognitive science towards the
study of the interaction between basic cognitive and embodied
structure and our lived experience. Taking metaphor away from
just poetic language and into the centre of everyday language and
ways of thinking, Lakoff and Johnson not just went against tra-
ditional linguistics but also against the sharp line between
rationality and emotion in Western thought and philosophy.
What the book suggested was that our language and our way of
thinking was embodied, and in some of their later writings this
notion was further expanded through the discovery of the role of
mirror neurons, and the role they play in explaining how lan-
guage and metaphors were indeed embodied, changed and
developed into networks of meaning structures (Lakoff, 2008).
Just as Varela et al. start from a computational understanding
of the brain, Lakoff and Johnson use this, not just to anchor the
understanding of language in our brain but to demonstrate how
very basic neural mechanisms serve pretty complicated mental
and linguistic processes that dominate in both everyday language,
poetic language and more abstract thinking and reasoning. “We
think with our brains. There is no other choice. Thought is
physical. Ideas and the concept s that make them up are physi-
cally ‘computed by brain structures. Reasoning is the activation of
certain neuronal groups in the brain given prior activation of
other neuronal groups (Lakoff, 2008, p 17) The neurological
starting point allows Lakoff to describe more precisely how
connectivity via the brain works in our language and way of
thinking. The brain is a complex of regions and neurons that
structure input and output, and as Lakoff points out “neurons
that ﬁre together, wire together (Lakoff, 2008, p 19). This basically
means that metaphors and metaphorical networks are built in our
mind in such a way that certain metaphorical connections are
stronger than others, although it also means that in our everyday
interaction with the world, metaphors are constantly changed,
developed or modiﬁed.
In 1980 when Metaphors we live by came out neuroscience and
cognitive psychology was not as far advanced as today, where the
mapping of the brain and how the embodied mind functions has
taken giant leaps. The move towards a stronger embodied mind
theory of linguistics was however taken quite a bit further in
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Mark Johnson’s The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of
Meaning, Imagination and Reason (1987). Here the criticism of
traditional objectivist linguistic theories of meaning went even
deeper and they formulated a broader, embodied theory of ima-
gination, metaphor and meaning. The theory of imagination,
metaphors and image schema in linguistics point to commu-
nication and ﬁlm studies and there are clearly many inter-
disciplinary dimensions in Lakoff and Johnson’s writings. We
ﬁnd the same kind of theoretical main focus in for instance David
Bordwell’s seminal book Narration in the Fiction ﬁlm (1985) in
which cognitive schema theory is used to explain different nar-
rative structures in ﬁlm and how viewers actively perceive a ﬁlm.
Also here the embodied mind theory is crucial. In Philosophy in
the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western
Thought (1999) they argue for an embodied philosophy, and in
George Lakoff’s Moral Politics. How Liberals and Conservatives
Think (2016) he moves into media and political communication.
Lakoff and Johnson’s intervention into linguistics, commu-
nication and philosophy illustrate the potential strength of cog-
nitive science to form a basis for ways of articulating, analysing
and understanding central areas of society and culture in different
disciplines. Their study of metaphor and the whole embodied
dimension of language and thought again underlines the inter-
action between our bodily capacities and the sensori-motoric
aspects of our embodied mind and the context we act in. There is
therefore a clear link between cognitive linguistics and the basic
dimensions in cognitive science as such. In their description of
cognition as embodied action Varela et al. call such cognitive
theories another way of avoiding the chicken-egg paradox of
cognition: the world does neither exist out there with pre-given
properties, nor is the world just a projection of our internal
system. The interaction between world (chicken) and embodied
mind (egg) is such that the interactions forms a new whole:
Cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come
from having a body with sensorimotor capacities, and
second that these sensorimotor capacities are themselves
embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychologi-
cal and cultural context (…) sensory and motor processes,
perception and action, are fundamentally inseparable in
lived cognition (1991, 172f).
Cognitive sociology: the perception of self and others
In cognitive science the relation between the brain, the body and
the social and cultural context is crucial, it is the interaction
between the embodied human mind and our everyday experience,
which is in focus. This means that our interaction with other
humans is crucial, and the way we understand and experience our
own self and that of others of equally strong importance. Such
questions are classical questions in philosophy, which have taken
new forms in both philosophy and in psychology and sociology
under the inﬂuence of cognitive science.
Psychology and psychoanalysis have, since the days of Freud
and Jung, been a varied, scientiﬁc ﬁeld of their own, but have also
inspired other areas—especially in the social sciences and
humanities. With the vastly increased empirical and clinical data
on how the brain and the embodied mind work, the ﬁeld that
used to be social psychology has moved in the direction of a
broader ﬁeld of cognitive sociology—and so has psychology in
general. In one of the ﬁrst major books aiming at changing the
focus of traditional psychology, Marvin Minsky’s The Society of
Mind (1985), even the title indicate that the study of the mind is
seen metaphorically as a both physical and social construction. In
his postscript Minsky deﬁnes the central concept of the book as
being “that the mind is a society of many smaller mechanisms’
(Minsky, 1985, p 323), mechanisms that work together to create
for instance memory, learning sensory experiences or our
understanding of ourselves as a self and our understanding of
others.
Minsky’s background is artiﬁcial intelligence at MIT, and the
way he writes about the mind is clearly inﬂuenced by thinking in
practical terms about models that could be implemented in
computers to simulate the human mind. The two authors of one
of the most used textbooks in cognitive sociology Social Cognition
(1984, 5th edn, many revised new editions), Susan T. Fiske and
Shelley E. Taylor, came out of mainstream American psychology,
and the book was written explicitly to counteract the dominance
of behaviourism. In the introduction the two authors deﬁne the
ﬁeld of social cognition as “the study of how people make sense of
other people and themselves. It focuses on how ordinary people
think about people and how they think they think about people”
(Fiske and Taylor (1991, p 1). The book goes through attribution
theory, that is how we ascribe value, meaning and causality to
social events, through the important social categories and sche-
mas we use in a top down way to understand both others, our-
selves and social actions. There is a focus on how we perceive our
selves and the role of memory and emotions and the forming of
attitudes. Compared to traditional psychology cognitive processes
play a fundamental role, although the book was written at a time
where modern neuroscience and cognitive studies was not as
advanced as today.
Fiske and Taylor’s book on social cognition is part of a wider
move towards what you might call a more universal cognitive
sociology. At least that is what Eviatar Zerubavel (1997) argues
for in his short but interesting book, Social Mindscapes. An
Invitation to Cognitive Sociology. He argues that in light of the
new developments in neuroscience and cognitive psychology, we
need to stress “the cognitive commonality” between all human
beings. The cognitive trend, as Zerubavel points out, moves away
from the almost romantic notions of the speciﬁcity of the indi-
vidual towards an endeavour to “discover universal patterns in
the way we form concepts, process information, activate mental
‘schemas’, make decisions, solve problems, generate meaningful
sentences from ‘deep’ syntactic structures, access our memory,
and move through the various stages of our cognitive develop-
ment” (Zerubavel, 1997, p 3).
However, Zerubavel also warns against a too strong and rigid
cognitive universalism, and argues for the interaction between
what he calls the collective subcultures linked to social and cul-
tural structures, which inﬂuence the way we think. In the same
way he argues for a stronger focus on also cognitive individual-
ism. His aim is clearly to link the understanding of the individual
cognitive mind and the social cognitive mind with the more
universal mind that are common to the whole of mankind. In this
sense he continues the trend in cognitive studies to undermine
any simple determinism in the understanding of the relation
between our universal mind and the social and cultural context
this mind of ours is living. Zerubavel wants us to pay more
attention to “cognitive diversity” and “cognitive subcultures”.
We must be aware of universal commonalities based on how
our mind and body function, no matter who we are and
where we are. At the same time we must not ignore that the
process of “cognitive socialisation that allows us to enter the
social, intersubjective world” (Zerubavel, 1997, p 15).
Such studies have in fact already appeared, for instance
Nicholas Christakis and James Fowlers fascinating study of social
networks, Connected. The Amazing Power of Social Networks and
How They Shape Our Lives (2009). Based on rich data on how
people on social networks connect, they clearly show how tech-
nologies in general are built on the same principles as those we
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know real life and traditional theories and studies of cognitive
sociology. Connections and networks are based on social and
cultural proximity and similarities, and very often emotions pay a
central role. Our contacts are based on mirror-acts, and the
fundamental way we form networks, even in this hi-tech complex
world of ours, are deeply structures by rules and mechanisms that
have evolved over a long time of genetic evolution. In their book
they exemplify this by studying political networks in several parts
of the world. Looking at for instance the Iranian political blo-
gosphere and the American we ﬁnd exactly the same structure.
The networks on the social media in both countries are similar to
social and political networks in real life. We connect and talk to
those we are alike and agree with already, so social networks only
to a very small degree expand our network to people we do not
know or already agree with (Christakis and Fowler, 2009, 172ff)
Networks, according to Christakis and Fowler, may therefore
seem very creative and different from the kinds of networks we
have seen before, but in reality they are expansions and variations
of rather fundamental, evolutionary mechanisms of social
interaction:
We deliberately choose to form social connections with speciﬁc
individuals, with whom we share greater or lesser intimacy and
affection, for brief or lengthy periods of time. And unlike other
social species, we have a special capacity to imagine what others
are thinking and feeling, including what they are thinking of us.
Our embeddedness in social networks means that we must
cooperate with others, judge their intentions, and inﬂuence or be
inﬂuenced by them (Christakis and Fowler, 2009, p 214).
Blending theory and our creative mind
Cognitive science is perhaps often seen as a rather simplifying
theory and way of understanding humans and the way humans
interact with the world and each other. However, as we have seen
with cognitive linguistics and sociology, the basic cognitive
understanding of communication and social encounters is clearly
used to develop quite complex and dynamic models of the human
mind and human activities. The fundamental call for a combi-
nation of a neurological and biological understand of the embo-
died mind with the human experience in all its dynamic cultural
and social experience and diversity we ﬁnd in Varela et al. and in
many other hard core books on cognitive science is developed
fully in other areas where a cognitive approach is used. One of the
most interesting developments in creative theory that builds of
basic cognitive science is Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnnier’s
theory of conceptual blending in thinking in general and pro-
duction of art speciﬁcally. There is a direct link between Varela
et al.’s general cognitive theory and Lakoff and Johnson’s cog-
nitive linguistics. The basic principle of blending is connected to
the theory of neurological metaphorical networks and to schema
theory in the sense that blending theory is trying to explain how
basic schematic structures make very complex and dynamic
variations possible.
As Turner and Fauconnier point out, humans have developed
an exceptionally ﬂexible and creative mind and many aspects of
the working brain and the embodied mind cut across different
activities in our everyday life and work. However, recently special
attention has been paid to the creative brain, more speciﬁcally in
art, ﬁlm and media. If art and creativity is about creating some-
thing new, this must in some way activate many and also different
part of our brain and the ways of thinking we have already
embedded in our brain. We know that part of our mind works
top down to activate established schemas, which can help us solve
speciﬁc problems or interpret a concrete social event. We use
what is already stored to navigate our reality. However, creativity
is also about creating new schemas and combining schemas we
already have in new ways. Fauconnier and Turners main point is
in fact that all humans are constantly developing the conceptual
neural networks we already have.
Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner have worked intensely
with this and what they call “conceptual blending”, especially in
their book The Way we Think. Conceptual Blending and the
Mind’s Hidden Complexities (2002). Their claim is in fact that
approximately 50,000 years ago, during the Upper Palaeolithic
period, a spectacular change took place, during which human
beings “developed an unprecedented ability to innovate. They
acquired a modern human imagination, which gave them the
ability to invent new concepts and to assemble new and dynamic
mental patterns” (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002, p 5). This ability,
called conceptual blending, is thus a general feature of the
modern human brain and mind, it is what makes it possible for
humans to develop large and very complex conceptual networks,
and also to develop, change and renew them. In their under-
standing, this is not just central to art, but something that
underlies all our mental activities from language, art and science
and down to basic everyday social skills.
In a later edited book by Mark Turner, The Artful Mind.
Cognitive Science and the Riddle of Human Creativity (2006)
focus is on how speciﬁcally to understand creativity in art forms,
and how this is related to our general ability to deals with quite
complex neural networks in our life in general. In all articles in
the book we ﬁnd a clear tendency to unite universal cognitive
patterns with more group based, even individual forms of social
and cultural cognition:
The individual human being, in form and movement, in
thought and action, is a seamless intersection of powerful
histories—phylogenetic history, individual development,
and social and cultural history—all profoundly inﬂuential.
A human being is a uniﬁed agency of biology, psychology,
and social, environmental and cultural patterns (Turner ed.
2006, p 16).
Therefore, even though all humans come with a body and a
brain which has a lot of pre-installed ‘hardware’ based on a long
evolutionary development, even though we are not in that sense
socially and culturally constructed, the bottom line in the theory
of the creative mind and blending theory is that we develop new
networks all the time. The fundamental dimensions of language,
of telling stories and making pictures, which is part of our evo-
lutionary history, is all there in our embodied and creative mind
from the day we are born. Yet, we do not all become great artists,
authors or ﬁlmmakers. The mix of genes, biology, evolution and
our social and cultural history as individuals and in families and
cultural groups is what shapes and forms a creative mind in such
a way that this individual changes history and our way of looking
at ourselves, others and the world. This is the magic of the
creative mind, the magic blending of the embodied mind, society
and culture.
Film, narrative and cognition
Fauconnier and Turners theory of blending and creative work is
in many ways exempliﬁed by the way in which cognitive ﬁlm
theory developed from the 1980s and on. Until then ﬁlm theory
was mostly inﬂuenced by structuralism or more classical aesthetic
approaches to the historical and genre based study of ﬁlm.
However, almost at the same time as Lakoff and Johnson started
changing our fundamental understanding of language by com-
bining cognitive theory and more formal and structural forms of
understanding, David Bordwell combined formal analysis and
cognitive psychology in the study of ﬁlm. In Narration in the
Fiction ﬁlm (1985) Bordwell discussed classical theories of ﬁlm
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narration with a new focus on the psychology of ﬁlm perception
and cognition. The inclusion of the viewer perspective was
important and novel for ﬁlm theory because Bordwell clearly
pointed out that a ﬁlm is both made by the director and other
creative people and the viewer, and that the system behind ﬁlm
narration and the viewers perception is based on perceptual and
cognitive dimensions of a more general nature. Watching a ﬁlm
was in Bordwell’s theory of narration a cognitive and emotional
process and experience, and using a just formal-aesthetic
approach to ﬁlm was not enough.
Bordwell’s way activating the process of viewing ﬁlm was a
direct critique of the dominant ﬁlm theories which tended to talk
about ﬁlm that positioned the viewer in a speciﬁc ideological way.
Instead Bordwell saw the ﬁlm as a way of cueing the spectators,
creating an active interaction between our already existing mental
schemas and the speciﬁc ﬁlm. Narration thus became an intense
meeting point between a ﬁlm and a viewer, based on a series of
psychological and cognitive procedures:
The fabula is thus a pattern, which perceivers of narratives
create through assumptions and inferences. It is the
developing result of picking up narrative cues, applying
schemata, framing and testing hypothesis (…) The viewer
builds the fabula on the basis of prototype schemata
(identiﬁable types of persons, actions, locales etc.), template
schemata (principally “the canonic story”) and procedural
schemata (a search for appropriate motivations and
relations of causality, time and space) (Bordwell, 1985, p 49).
Bordwell combined this more formal, structural, psychological
and cognitive approach to ﬁlm with a more concrete historical
deﬁnition of basic forms of narration: Classical narration is basically
the Hollywood mode of narration and at the same time a rather
canonic form with a strong position as universally understandable;
Art cinema narration on the other hand is a historical type of
narration, which challenges the canonical form of narration.
Bordwell also discussed other forms like Historical-Materialist
narration in early Soviet cinema, and what he called parametric
narration. Again we see a combination of more basic cognitive
forms of psychology and concrete historical and aesthetic analysis
situating the cognitive dimensions in a social and cultural context.
Bordwell is a founding father in cognitive ﬁlm theory, building
connections to also more aesthetic and historical forms of ﬁlm
theory and ﬁlm history. Today cognitive ﬁlm theory has devel-
oped into the most comprehensive theory of ﬁlm. Another
important ﬁgure is Torben Grodal whose work is based on an
evolutionary understanding of how ﬁlm genres interact with our
emotional and cognitive structures. His two books Moving Pic-
tures. A New Theory of Film Genres, Feelings and Cognition
(1996) and Embodied Visions. Evolution, Emotion, Culture and
Film (2009) are both key texts in modern, cognitive ﬁlm theory.
Grodal’s ﬁrst book was in many ways similar in general approach
to Joseph Anderson’s The reality of Illusion: An Ecological
Approach to Cognitive Film Theory (1996) in the sense that they
draw on the large scale evolutionary perspective. Here the pre-
mise is that the narrative and other schemata we use in ﬁlm
viewing have an effect on our general real life experience:
(..) the schemata we bring to ﬁlms are those we bring to
other experiences in the world and when the viewing
experience modiﬁes those schemata (as all perceptual and
cognitive cycles do) it has in some ways change the way we
interact with the world (Anderson 1996, p 155).
The cognitive theory of ﬁlm and ﬁlm narratives see the ﬁlmic
form and ﬁlmic genres as speciﬁc domains of art and commu-
nication. Genres are—as Grodal point out in his works—ways of
integrating human characters, actions and emotions, which can be
seen as ﬁlm forms and ﬁlmic representations of real life. Genres are
however also modalities of narration and emotions that build on
and interact with real life experience and draw on our embodied
mind structures. Melodrama is quite distinct from romantic
comedy or from action-adventure movies for instance, however the
narrative and emotional structures point us back to networks of
meaning and experiences in our embodied mind. Just as Bordwell
stressed the relation between ﬁlm form and genre and the cognitive
aspects of the spectator, Grodal already in his ﬁrst book pointed to
(..) a systematic relation between the embodied mental
processes and conﬁgurations activated in a given type of
visual ﬁction and the emotional ‘tone’ and ‘modal qualities
of the experienced affects, emotions and feelings in the
viewer. Prototypical genres of visual ﬁction will evoke
typical tones and modalities (..) (Grodal, 1996, p 3)
Putting the embodied mind in the context of ﬁlm viewing
therefore also leads to an alignment between cognitive structures
and emotions in reality and in ﬁlm. As Lakoff has pointed out
(Lakoff, 2008, pp 27–28, see also Bondebjerg, 2014) narratives, even
complex narratives, are not just something we ﬁnd in language, ﬁlm
and literature, they are in fact central cognitive structures of the
world of ﬁction and non-ﬁction and our way of experiencing our
everyday reality. Frames and scripts are cognitive schemata, and
they are used all the time to structure mediated experiences and real
life events. Narrative then, is in fact also a result of evolution, it is a
cognitive schema we all possess and which is part of the way we
understand reality and create meaning based on characters, space,
events, time and causality. Life around us, the people we meet and
the actions and events we are involved in are constantly interpreted
by our narrative ‘gene’ to make stories of others, just as our own life
and self is reﬂected in a constantly updated self-narrative (Bruner,
1996 and 2002, Gottschall, 2012).
History, memory and ﬁlm
Memory is one of the most debated issues in cognitive theory,
and in memory studies more broadly. The cognitive procedures
and functions of memory are crucial to our way of experiencing
a coherent self over time and for our ability to navigate in
the present. In a paradoxical way then, the past is in many
ways a very important part of the present. Memory researchers
like José van Dijck (2007) and Astrid Erll (2011) point out
that our brain stores data on the past from both ﬁction and non
ﬁction sources, from real life experience and mediated experience
in such a way that they are mixed or interact in various ways.
Stories affect our minds and memories, ﬁction teaches us facts
about the world, and as Gottschall states: ‘ﬁction has probably
told us as much about the world as anything else’ (Gottschall,
2012, p 149).
Fiction needs to be taken seriously as a factor inﬂuencing the
human mind and our individual and collective memory. But
looking at the concept of memory, we can even take this much
further. First of all, memory is extremely important both on and
individual level and a collective social level. Without memory we
loose feeling of who we are and our social ability to navigate in
society disappears. In José van Dijck’s Mediated Memoirs in the
Digital Age (2007) he simply states that:
Remembering is vital to our well-being, because without
our autobiographical memories we would have no sense of
past or future, and we would lack any sense of continuity.
Our image of who we are (…) is never stable but it is
subject to constant remodelling because our perceptions of
who we are change along with our projections and desires
of who we want to be (Dijck, 2007, p 3).
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He combines this observation with a reference to Susan Bluck’s
(2003) deﬁnition of the three main functions of autobiographical
memory: preserving the sense of being a coherent person over
time; strengthening social bonds by sharing personal memories;
and using past experiences to construct models to understand
inner worlds of self and others.
As we all know from experience, memory is imperfect, seen
from an objective point of view. We constantly forget things and
happenings in the past, or we interpret the same things differ-
ently. As Gottschall formulates it: when we try to recall something
in the past we are not just simply “queuing up a videotape; we
recall bits of data from all around the brain. These data are then
sent forward to the storytelling mind (…) who stiches and pasts
the scraps and fragments into a coherent and plausible re-
creation of what might have occurred’ (Gottschall, 2012, p 169).
In other words the past as it is represented in our mind is a
‘mental simulation’—not mere ﬁction, not without a ﬁrm base in
actual past experiences, but a narrative, a ‘ﬁctionalisation.’ The
neurological, biological background for this can be found in the
fact that memory is not located in one speciﬁc part of the brain, as
Dijck points out:
The establishment of memory depends on the working of
the entire brain network, consisting in turn of several
memory systems, including semantic and episodic memory,
declarative or procedural memory (…) the brain is thus the
generator of reﬂexes, responses, drives, emotions and
ultimately, feelings; memory involves both the perception
of a certain body state and a certain mind state’ (Dijck,
2007, p 31).
Memory is not just individual, it has a clear collective dimen-
sion and social function. This collective and social form
of memory has always been around, but since this form of
memory to a large degree includes mediated forms, the rise of
audio-visual and digital media with vast archive functions have
changed our access to collective memory. In an article with the
title ‘ A Cognitive Taxonomy of Collective Memory’ the two
cognitive psychologists David Manier and William Hirst (2008)
divided the forms of collective memory into three: collective-
episodic memory, the form of collective memory shared by a
speciﬁc social group (including families); collective-semantic
memory, the form of collective memory persons or groups can
have about past and historic events and times they do not have
personal experience of themselves, but where the memory is based
on narratives from others and mediated narratives; Collective-
procedural memory, the form of collective memory which is
situated around collective and institutional rituals and thus con-
nected with traditions of remembrance. This distinction between
individual and collective memory and the different forms of
memory is of course not a sharp division. The different domains
and forms of memory interact in any individual’s memory. As
individuals we are part of a broader social and cultural context,
and collective memories—for instance in the form of mediated
collective narratives—mingle with personal memories.
In modern times, after the rise of television, ﬁlm and new
digital media, one could argue that mediated forms of memory
has become so important that it is necessary to deﬁne a new mode
of public cultural memory. This is precisely what Alison Lands-
berg has argued—following the already mentioned work of José
van Dijck—and she calls this “prosthetic memory” in her book
Prosthetic Memory. The Transformation of American Remem-
brance in the Age of Mass Culture (2004). She deﬁnes this form of
mediated memory as something emerging “at the interface
between a person and a historical narrative about the past”
(Landsberg, 2004, p 2) and she elaborates further on the nature of
this merging:
In the process I am describing, the person does not simply
apprehend a historical narrative but takes on a more personal,
deeply felt memory of a past event through which he or she did
not live. The resulting prosthetic memory has the ability to shape
that person’s subjectivity and politics (ibid.)
Conclusion
The understanding of the brain and the biology behind the
concept of the embodied mind is no longer a case for the medical
sciences, for neuroscience and medicine, nor for the high tech
versions of artiﬁcial intelligence. If the understanding of a cul-
tured person used to be one that knew history, literature and the
arts, one might suggest that today more than ever, we also need to
know the basics of how our mind and body work. From lin-
guistics to the creative arts, from psychology to sociology, from
history and memory studies to studies of mediated networks and
communication, the insight of cognitive theory has made a deep
impact on traditional areas of research.
The impact of cognitive theory on for instance the humanities
and social science is still heavily debated, and many researchers
tend to see cognitive theory as reductionist and deterministic in
the understanding of culture and society. Although such positions
can be found in cognitive theory, my presentation of main ten-
dencies in the development of the theory of the embodied mind
clearly shows a different picture. It seems that most of the proliﬁc
researchers in this tradition are very much aware of the dynamic
relations between the brain, the mind, and the body as a biolo-
gical phenomenon and the cultural and social context. There is in
fact a very nuanced understanding of the way rather ﬁrmly,
evolutionary elements in our body and brain has been inﬂuenced
and is constantly inﬂuenced by evolution and by our individual
and group oriented cultural and social actions and experiences.
Needles to say, that such a fundamental understanding of the
interaction between body, brain and our social and cultural
environment is based on the understanding of evolution, Darwin
started. It is probably the best supported scientiﬁc hypothesis in
modern history.
To just ignore cognitive and evolutionary theory would be a
major mistake, the embodied mind theory is in fact one of the
most promising theories in a long time. It is a theory that has the
potential to make researchers from very different disciplines
speak on the basis of a common framework for the understanding
of man in culture and society. It is not the grand theory to end all
other theories, but it is theory that in many ways celebrates and
explains why humans have what Fauconnnier and Turner has
described as a fantastic creative mind, and what can make the
neuroscientist Anton Damasio become quite poetic:
And what is the ultimate gift of consciousness to humanity?
Perhaps the ability to navigate the future in the seas of our
imagination, guiding the self craft into a safe and
productive harbour. The greatest of all gifts depends once
again, on the intersection of the self and memory. Memory,
tempered by personal feeling, is what allows humans to
imagine both individual well-being and the compounded
well-being of a whole society, and to invent the ways and
means of achieving and magnifying that well-being
(Damasio, 2012, pp 296–97).
Cognitive science has developed into one of the most important
core sciences for the understanding of the embodied, human mind.
Step by step neurology uncovers new aspects of how the brain
works and how the different regions and part of the brain colla-
borate. We know by know that it is an extremely complex, dynamic
and creative brain evolution has given us, and we also know that
ancient ways of understand the relation between mind and body,
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and between rationality and emotion can no longer be sustained.
This means that cognitive science has already had fundamental
inﬂuence on how we look at humans and consequently also how
humans, culture and society interact. Cognitive science and the
embodied mind theory has been very inﬂuential in creating link
across various academic disciplines—although it is also still con-
troversial in some parts of humanities and social science.
In this article I have tried to give an overview of basic elements
in cognitive science with a special focus on key concepts like
schemata in social and communicative interaction, metaphors
and neural networks, narrative, creativity and memory and his-
torical narratives. Taken from basic cognitive science such con-
cepts have played an important role in changing the way social
sciences and humanities look at culture and society. A main point
in this connection is that cognitive science does not rest on a
deterministic notion of the human brain, on the contrary. Cog-
nitive science and modern neurology consider the interaction
between the embodied mind and the social and cultural context
to be of extreme importance. It is a highly dynamic interaction in
which pre-established structures of the brain ‘negotiate’ with and
constantly change and develop in connection with the experi-
ences we have as individual, human beings in a speciﬁc cultural
and social context.
As the leading American neurologist, Antonio Damasio, has
stated:
Naturalising the conscious mind and planting it ﬁrmly in
the brain does not diminish the role of culture in the
construction of human beings, does not reduce human
dignity, and does not mark the end of mystery and
puzzlement. Cultures arise and evolve from collective
efforts of human brains, over many generations, and some
cultures even die in the process. They require brains that
have already been shaped by prior cultural effects. The
signiﬁcance of cultures to the making of the modern human
mind is not in question (Damasio, 2012, p 29).
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